Jesse Norman: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his thorough and wide-ranging remarks. He is right that it is a kind of principle of tax policy in a way, or the typical reaction of an individual, and one wishes that the general instinct shared by 98% or 99% of the tax-paying population that he articulated well —namely, that if it looks too good to be true, it almost certainly is too good to be true—was shared by the whole of the population. However, for different reasons, that is not the case. The hon. Gentleman is right to articulate the principle that if it looks too good to be true, it is, and I  thank him for doing so. I also thank him and his colleagues for the nuanced interrogation they have given this policy, but not diverging from us on its core thrust.
I want to make it clear that I am not remotely downplaying, undervaluing or minimising the personal feelings of people, or the impact or hardship that they have experienced as a result of this situation. Clearly, there have been cases that have been felt across the House and raised by different MPs, and Revenue and Customs understands that as well. It has made it very clear that it will not force people to sell their main home; that it will not, except in the most unusual circumstances, put people into bankruptcy; and that it will exercise, by adhering to a series of principles, a judicious approach to people’s settlement processes. That includes a principle that no more than half of someone’s disposable income should go to settle a tax dispute, so that families have not only their non-disposable income but at least half of their disposable income to support themselves.
Those principles also include, as I have indicated, a set of basic time periods to make a settlement—of five years in the case of someone earning over £50,000 a year, and of seven years in the case of someone earning over £30,000 a year—and that is part of the practice of Revenue and Customs, and a well-embedded principle.
Furthermore, if people have concerns that they are being badly handled in this process—this also relates to the point that the hon. Gentleman made about an independent review—they can appeal to tax commissioners for, as it were, an investigation and review. Of course, they also have the ability to go to their MP, and Members are very effective in raising tax-related issues on behalf of their constituents.

Jesse Norman: Of course, the approach taken needs to have foundational principles aligned to it, and those can be questioned in specific contexts and by the mechanisms that I have described.
The distributional impact of the way the loan charge disguised remuneration population breaks down has been put into the public domain and analysed by HM Revenue and Customs. For example, a relatively small number of people work in caring professions, contrary to the impression that colleagues may have been given. That is the context in which the final recommendation by Sir Amyas Morse, which is that these debts should be written off after 10 years, has been rejected by the Government. It is a recognition of Sir Amyas’s expertise and independence that nine of his recommendations were accepted, and the Government have given a full account of the reason why they have rejected the 10th.
In line with Sir Amyas’s recommendations on voluntary restitution, HMRC will refund voluntary restitution already paid for years now out of scope of the loan charge, but will not refund settlements for the underlying tax liability where HMRC had protected its position. That is so that the treatment remains in line with the existing legal framework for HMRC to recover tax. Sir Amyas also recommended that for disguised remuneration loans taken out on or after 9 December 2010, HMRC should only refund voluntary restitution where the scheme user had reasonably disclosed their scheme use. We have discussed that already at some length.
Regarding some of the impact of the different pressures that may be on taxpayers, HMRC will not as a matter of course meet professional costs incurred by taxpayers in reaching their original settlement or claiming refunds, but it may meet professional costs where they have been incurred as a direct result of a mistake or an unreasonable delay in its own dealings with a taxpayer’s affairs. That was not the position when HMRC was applying legislation in place at the time.
Refunding fees to those who have used avoidance schemes would send the thoroughly troubling message that taxpayers who had not used those schemes might not do as well as those who had, which is not one that this House should be particularly encouraging. Of course, if a taxpayer feels they have grounds for making a complaint, the usual mechanisms are available for them to do so.
In his recommendation 14, Sir Amyas called for the Government to report to Parliament on all aspects of their implementation of the loan charge changes,
“before the end of 2020”.
We will do that. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for laying out her concerns in that regard in this debate, and I will ensure that the officials understand and reflect on them when they start to frame this report.
As per Sir Amyas’s recommendations, the report will draw on input from the HMRC customer experience committee. It is very important to realise that the committee includes not only the non-executive directors of Revenue and Customs, but highly experienced independent people in positions of authority and expertise who are specifically customer experience experts in the private sector. The effect of the committee is to support but also challenge the HMRC executive on customer experience-related issues, and to help the Department deliver on its strategic objectives. In other words, part of its point is to ensure that HMRC treats taxpayers with a proper degree of courtesy and service levels, but in no sense becomes oppressive to them.
Let me pick up another important point, which I meant to mention earlier but have not yet: the very strong approach that HMRC is taking on promoters and enablers of tax avoidance. Certainly since I have been Financial Secretary to the Treasury, we have significantly enhanced the already substantial work being done in that area. That includes work that builds collaboration across Government, including with bodies such as the Advertising Standards Authority or the Insolvency Service. It involves proactive communications to help taxpayers to steer clear of avoidance.
HMRC has launched a consultation on ways to combat the promotion and enabling of tax avoidance; colleagues from different parties are welcome to make contributions  to that if they wish. The areas it is looking at include tackling promoters and their supply chains, looking at the economics of tax avoidance, disrupting business models and improving compliance and enforcement in other ways. I would like the Committee to understand that HMRC is in no sense minimising the importance of going after promoters and enablers where it can—subject to law, and with new powers if it should be so decided after the process of consultation.